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: IN THE SUPREME COURT 
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEULAH B. GOCKE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
OTTO A. 'VIESLEY, DANIEL A. 
EL T 0 N, ELIOT Y. GATES, 
:MEMBERS OF BOARD OF RE-
YIE'V OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DE-
PARTMENT OF EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY, Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10514 
On September 29, 1965, a representative of the 
Utah Department of Employment Security of the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah issued a review decision 
affirming a prior decision issued September 14, 1965, 
denying unemployment benefits to the appellant for the 
ten-week period commencing September 5, 1965, and 
ending November 8, 1965, on the grounds that she did 
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not meet the eligibility requirement of the Utah Em-
ployment Security Act that a claimant be available for 
work. 
After due notice and hearing the Appeals Referee 
of the Department of Employment Security on No-
vember 8, 1965, affirmed the ineligibility of the claimant 
for unemployment benefits to the date of hearing, 
November 4, 1965. On December 1, 1965, the Board 
of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah af-
firmed the decision of the Appeals Referee and denied 
any further hearing on appeal. The matter is now 
before this Court on a petition for review of the decision 
of the Board of Review, which was filed on the 20th 
day of December, 1965. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts is correct except 
m two respects: 
1. The record does not show as stated on page one 
of appellant's brief that the appellant was told 
that her former employer wished to rehire her 
as soon as she was able to return to work. Rather 
the prospect of return to such employer was 
indefinite (R-16, 18, 19). 
2. The record does not show that the appellant 
contacted her former employer as the appellant's 
brief (at page three) indicates between Sep-
tember 14, 1965, and November 4, 1965, but 
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only that she did so within the last two weeks in 
September ( R-22) . 
THE ISSUE 
The issue involved in this case is whether the appel-
lant must be allowed unemployment benefits as a matter 
of right on the grounds that there was no evidence what-
soever to support the respondents' finding that her 
personal efforts to seek work were insufficient in light 
of her individual circumstances to indicate a definite 
affirmative attachment to the labor market or avail-
ability for work. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
ACT BARS THE DEPART~IENT OF EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY FROM PAYING 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS EXCEPT 
WHERE THE CLAI~IANT IS BOTH REGIS-
TERED FOR WORK AND AVAILABLE FOR 
WORK. 
That portion of the Employment Security Act 
which is central to this case is 35-4-4, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended, which imposes a limitation 
upon eligibility for unemployment benefits as follows: 
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"35-4-4 An unemployed individual shall be 
eligible to receive benefits with respect to any 
week only if it has been found by the commission 
that: 
" (a) He has made a claim for benefits with 
respect to such week in accordance with such 
regulations as the commission may prescribe. 
"(b) He has registered for work at, and there-
after continued to report at, an employment of-
fice, ... 
" ( c) He is able to work and is available for 
work." 
The plain meaning of the quoted language is to 
require a disallowance of unemployment benefits unless 
the commission finds that the claimant has fulfilled 
several conjunctive requirements, these pertaining to 
(a) filing claims, and (b) registering for work and con-
tinuing thereafter to report at the employment off ice, 
and ( c) being for the period in question able to work 
and available for work. That the requirement of avail-
ability for work is a separate one to be met on a week-
by-week basis, over and above the claimant's mere regis-
tration and reporting, appears clear from the structure 
of the Act and such has been affirmed by cases in other 
jurisdictions. Chadwick v. E,mployment Security Board 
of Review, 192 Kan. 769, 390 P. 2d 1017; Shannon v. 
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 155 Ohio St. 
53, 97 NE 2d 425; Department of Industrial Relations 
v. Tomlinson (Alabama) , 36 So. 2d 496. 
It is apparent that the commission may and must 
require affirmative indications that the several funda-
4 
mental requirements are met as a basis for its findings 
to that effect. In accord is the leading Michigan case 
of Dwyer v. Appeal Board of Michigan, U. C. Comm., 
321 :Mich. 178, 32 NW 2d 434. By the same token, the 
commission would act inconsistently with the law if it 
declared such requirements to have been met and al-
lowed benefits when it had evidence before it indicating 
the contrary to be true. This is particularly true when 
there has been a voluntary withdrawal from the labor 
market and an absence therefrom for several months. 
POINT TWO 
IN APPL YING THE "AVAILABLE FOR 
'VORK" REQUIREMENTS OF THE EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY ACT, THE DE-
PARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
MAY LOOK BEYOND A CLAIMANT'S MERE 
DECLARED SUBJECTIVE WILLINGNESS 
TO ACCEPT 'VORK FOR OBJECTIVE EVI-
DENCES OF AVAILABILITY SUCH AS PER-
SON AL EFFORTS TO SEEK WORK. 
In the appellant's brief the foregoing point is con-
ceded. However, since this case is one of the first im-
pression in certain aspects the related authorities should 
be cited. They are clearly to the effect that "availability 
for work" as used in Employment Security Acts im-
plies an obligation upon the claimant to make personal 
efforts to find work. In Dwyer v. Appeal Board of 
Michigan U. C. Commission, supra, the Michigan Court 
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analyzed an act identical in its material respects to that 
in Utah and concluded that registration and availability 
for work are separate requirements, and that from the 
availability requirement it is reasonable to infer the 
need for a personal search for work as an affirmatin 
indication of labor market attachment. The Court spe-
cifically found the Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission to be right in its position that it could not find 
the availability requirement met without an objective 
manifestation of attachment to the labor market by 
the claimant's efforts to seek work. 
Among numerous other authorities in accord are 
Teague v. Florida Industrial Commission (Florida), 
104 So. 2d 612; Shannon v. Bureau of Unemployment 
Compensation, supra; Department of Industrial Rela-
tion v. Tomlinson, supra; Farrer v. Director of Divi-
t)ion of Employment Security, 324 l\'Iass. 45, 84 NE 2d 
540; Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 
NE 2d 762, and cases cited therein. 
The duty to determine the facts has been delegated 
to the commission by law and a realistic interpretation 
of the facts and circumstances is essential to the suc-
cessful operation of the program. 
In its search for truth, the commission has the right 
and duty to consider the interest of the appellant; the 
probability or improbability of her assertions in light 
of the proved or admitted facts; the general situation 
as shown by all of the surrounding circumstances ; the 
conditions or compulsions under which the appellant 
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acted and under which she testifies; her prejudices, if 
any, and her desires; together with many other factors 
including restrictions as to wages, hours, and kinds of 
work which the appellant will accept. (Indiana) Haynes 
v. Brown (1949) 88 NE 2d 795; Walton v. JVilhelrn, 
91 NE 2d 373 . 
Basically the commission operates on the premise 
that the philosophy underlying the "availability" re-
quirement is that benefits under the unemployment 
compensation system should be resened for those un-
employed workers, otherwise eligible, who maintain a 
genuine attachment to the labor market. 
Obviously any general premise must be imple-
mented. Each claimant must be tested or examined on 
a week-by-week basis to determine whether he or she 
has done those things which might be reasonably ex-
pected of one diligently seeking work, keeping in mind 
his skill, his training, and the labor market. 
We agree with the Nelson v. Van Horn Construc-
tion Cornpany case cited by appellant at page 8, that 
a union man who pays his dues and keeps in contact 
with his union is diligently seeking work when in his 
labor market the majority of all construction workers 
are hired by employers through the union hiring hall. 
An employer might be expected to rehire an em-
ployee through a telephone contact. '"' e cannot agree 
that telephone calls asking whether openings exist are 
a reflection of a genuine labor market attachment, par-
7 
ticularly when they are few in number and over a ten-
week period. At best they constitute a desultory effort. 
POINT THREE 
A PROPER AD.MINISTRATIVE TEST TO 
BE APPLIED IN '"7"EIGHING THE SUFFI-
CIENCY OF A CLAIMANT'S PERSONAL 
EFFORTS TO SEEK 'VORK AS AN OBJEC-
TIVE INDICATOR OF AVAILABILITY FOR 
WORK IS WHETHER THE CLAIMANT 
ACTED IN A REASONABLE .MANNER UN-
DER HIS INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
TO RELIEVE HIS UNEMPLOYMENT. 
Among the authorities cited under Point Two 
above are numerous statements evaluating the respec-
tive claimant's efforts to seek work against the standard 
of a reasonable search in terms of the claimant's facts 
and circumstances. 'Vith considerable uniformity the 
cases on availability observe that the determination 
is an individual one to be made by the application of 
basic guides (the reasonable search or reasonable con-
duct test) to the claimant's peculiar facts and circum-
stances. In cases where the test used is not "reasonable 
efforts" it is often "active efforts." An example of the 
latter construction under a statute materially identical 
to Utah's is Florida Industrial Commi.ssion v. Ciarlante 
(Florida), 84 So. 2d I. In the course of an extensive 
review of sustaining authorities, the case being one of 
the first impression there, the Florida Court noted: 
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"It has also been argued here that the policy 
adopted by the Florida Industrial Commission 
of requiring claimants to indicate their desire to 
become employed and their 'availability for 
work' by actively seeking work has the effect of 
adding, adminstratively, an additional require-
ment for eligibility . . . This contention cannot 
be sustained. The Act not only requires registra-
tion for employment but also, that the claimant 
be found to be able to work and available for 
work. It does not seem to be an unreasonable 
interpretation of the general terms of the statute 
that 'availability' should be evidenced by some-
thing more than mere registration with an em-
ployment agency and expressed willingness to 
work." 
POINT FOUR 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
IN THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT CON-
SIDERING HER INDIVIDUAL FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES THE APPELLANT DID 
NOT ACT REASONABLY TO RELIEVE HER 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAS NOT AV AIL-
ABLE FOR WORK. 
The appellant's case on appeal relies heavily upon 
the assertion that she had a definite prospect of early 
re-employment with her former employer and that she 
looked, therefore, initially to this source rather than 
to extensive outside contacts. However, if the record 
be examined closely it may be seen that the claimant 
did not in fact have any definite prospect with her 
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former and that she knew or might have known this 
both by the facts as to her relationship with the em-
ployer before and after her separation and by the facts 
as to the limitations upon her own hours of work as 
contrasted to the employer's required or desired hours 
for her services. 
Although the appellant's brief states broadly that 
she left employment with the understanding that the 
employer "wished to rehire her as soon as she was able 
to return to work" (p. 1), the record is devoid of sub-
stantiation of this assertion. Rather, the appellant gives 
indication by her own testimony that: ( 1) the employer 
declined to place her on pregnancy leave, in effect 
denying her the right of rehire after the birth of her 
child (R-16), (2) that the company treatment on the 
occasion of her termination bothered her with the notion 
that something was wrong which she might have been 
in a position to correct ( R-16) , ( 3) that as of Sep-
tember 13, 1965, her former employer had no openings 
and was not hiring (R-15, 16), (4) that from Sep-
tember 13, 1965, to the first week in October she was 
definitely limited to working day shift only ( R-15, 
17), and ( 5) that thereafter her willingness to work 
other than day shifts was extremely doubtful. As to 
this latter point, the appellant reported at various times 
during the hearing: "If I had to I could work swing 
shift. It would not be convenient, but if I had to I 
could," ( R-15), "I did work night shift (previously) 
because my children were old enough to ... " (R-16), 
"I wanted to worl.; days last year and I couldn't trans-
10 
fer" (R-16), "I finally decided that maybe if I could 
possibly get on at nights out there, because they have 
more turnover on the night shift, that I could try it 
for awhile. It wouldn't be the most satisfactory arrange-
ment'' ( R-17), "I don't think I could work very long 
on the night shift, as far as that goes. They would have 
to transfer me." (R-17). (Emphasis supplied.) 
Considering these several indications of the appel-
lant's actual unwillingness to work night shift, her 
extra problems of leaving a new baby at night and her 
inability to get back to work on day shift as emphasized 
by her former inability, even while actively employed, 
to transfer to day shift, it is not unreasonable to con-
clude that the appellant had no good prospect of re-
employment at her former place of work. .More impor-
tant as pertaining to her subjective frame of mind, it 
is also reasonable to conclude from the foregoing that 
the appellant must have realized the great likelihood 
that she would not find work with her former employer 
at all, let alone on a basis compatible with her limited 
freedom as to hours. As a further indication of this 
latter likelihood, the appellant's counsel by leading 
questions implied a possibility that the appellant had 
personal difficulties at her former employment. The 
questions and answers thereto, taken with the earlier 
reference at R-16, fairly sustain at least an inference 
that the appellant did have a feeling of some personal 
attitude or prejudice against her at the former employ-
ment (R-21, 22). 
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The record also contains evidence sustaining infer-
ences that the appellant's search for work independent 
of the former employer was not a reasonable one, under 
her circumstances. The appellant reported no personal 
contacts to locate prospective new employment for more 
than two months following the birth of her baby on 
July 24, 1965 ( R-17), although she was released by 
the doctor midway in that period (September 4, 1965) 
(R-17). According to the testimony, her first personal 
application was to Albertson's on October 15, 1965 
(R-20), nearly three months after the birth of her 
child, six weeks after her release by the doctor, and four 
weeks after she was advised of the denial of benefits 
because of her failure to show by her efforts a genuine 
availability for work (R-46). This fact negatives to a 
great extent the assertions elsewhere in the record that 
the appellant was acting reasonably to minimize the 
length of her unemployment and obtain an early return 
to work. 
When asked by the Referee (R-19) what she was 
doing to occupy her time primarily, the appellant re-
plied: "Truthfully, getting everything caught up that 
I could possibly get caught up in the house so that I 
would be ready to go at a minute's notice for work, I 
mean. Doing extra cleaning and doing extra sewing, 
trying to get my children's wardrobes complete for 
the year until next summer. This is just practical think-
ing, I feel." This is not indicative of a genuine attach-
ment to the labor market. Rather it reflects a lack of 
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urgency to seek work even though at that time her 
husband was apparently also unemployed. 
The appellant reported on September 13, 1965, 
that the " ... kinds of work" she was " ... ready, will-
ing, and able to accept" were "Electronics assembly 
work" and that the minimum wage which would be 
acceptable to her was $1.85 per hour, based on the scale 
in that occupation (R-15, 27). Despite this fact, she 
made only one personal application to an employer in 
that field during the entire fifteen weeks from the date 
of birth of her child to the date of hearing (R-20). 
Although she made a few telephone calls to other places, 
it was not capricious or arbitrary for the Referee and 
the Board to view these as an insufficient substitute for 
actual visits to places of prospective employment in her 
field when they were attempting to determine whether 
the appellant acted like a person who really wanted 
to find early employment. It is submitted that the 
minimal effort of a personal application rather than 
a mere telephone call is not an unreasonable one to 
expect of the sincere job seeker who is anxious to end 
his unemployment. 
Further, the appellant reported applications to 
two grocery markets and telephone calls to a jewelry 
company, a bag company, and food company as indica·· 
tive of her active efforts to seek work ( R-20). Although 
the record does not attempt either to substantiate or 
impeach her sincerity as to these places, such sincerity 
does appear questionable on the face of the record since 
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none offers work in the technical occupation which she 
reported as her basis of availability. The record does 
not develop t!1e facts as to any potential salary disparity 
between the appellant's expressed minimum acceptable 
wage of $1.85 per hour and the going rate for the other 
divergent occupations about which she says she inquired, 
but such disparity might well exist. Now here in the 
record does the appellant express herself as being 
willing to change occupations or accept a lower wage. 
Counsel for appellant reports his failure to find 
any case in which efforts comparable to the appellant's 
have been determined to be insufficient as an indication 
of availability for work. '7\Thile it is true that the cases 
turn very much upon individual facts and circumstances 
and the inferences therein, the authorities are not with-
out examples parallel to the appellant's facts. In the 
case of Ethel R. Chadwick v. Employment Security 
Board of Review, supra, the Kansas Supreme Court 
in 1964 reversed the District Court and upheld the 
Board's decision denying benefits on the insufficiency 
of the claimant's efforts to seek work, concluding that 
there was relevant evidence in the record from which 
the Board might determine as it did that the efforts 
were not a reasonable search for work for one in the 
claimant's circumstances. The claimant in that case 
was a telephone operator who worked until October 
15, 1961, at which time she entered on pregnancy leave. 
Following the birth of her child on December 11, 1961, 
she was released to work by her doctor on January 21, 
1962. She initiated a claim for unemployment benefits 
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on January 14, 1962. She attempted unsuccessfully to 
obtain reinstatement with her former employer and to 
transfer from Olathe, Kansas, to Parsons, Kansas, 
where her husband had moved and was working. On 
March 22, 1962, the claimant moved to Parsons. This 
' claimant's efforts to seek work in the period of January 
21, 1962, to April 25, 1962, were found by the Referee 
to have included personal applications to the county 
courthouse, the Olathe News, "various PBX users" 
(number unspecified), and two Federal agencies. The 
latter two employers required a test which the claimant 
had not taken as of the date of the hearing. 
The Court found the claimant to have made three 
personal applications between January 21, 1962, and 
1 March 12, 1962, and three more personal applications 
between March 13, 1962, and April 25, 1962. The 
claimant also registered for work and reported weekly 
at the State Employment Office. The claimant in this 
case reported that she would accept a minimum wage of 
$75.00 per week and that she would work day hours. 
In her former job she had been paid $78.50 per week 
and she appears to have worked at least some night 
hours. 
In concluding that the claimant's actions did not 
constitute a reasonable effort to seek work within the 
meaning of the availability statute, the Kansas Court 
cited its own earlier case of Clark v. Board of Review, 
187 Kan. 695, 359 P. 2d 856, in which the Court re-
viewed numerous authorities as to the meaning of "rea-
15 
sonable efforts to find work" and noted, " . . . one of 
the tests is whether the facts show that a claimant 
sincerely wants work and has acted in a reasonable 
manner under his circumstances in trying to relieve 
his unemployment." (At 359 P. 2d 858.) 
POINT FIVE 
THAT IN REVIE\VING DETERMINA-
TIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYlVIENT SE-
CURITY ACT THE COURT \VILL AFFIRl\I 
THE COl\IMISSION FINDINGS IF SUCH 
ARE SUSTAINED BY EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD. 
Although the point is not disputed, it might be 
noted herein that consistently with the general rule as 
to scope of review in administrative cases this Court 
will affirm an administrative denial of benefits unless 
such denial was clearly capricious, arbitrary, and un-
reasonable. Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees 
v. Department of Ernployment Security, 13 Utah 2d 
262, 372 P. 2d 987. In Members of Iron Workers Union 
of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 242, 2418; 
139 P. 2d 208, 211, this Court said: 
"If there is substantial competent evidence to 
sustain the findings and decision of the Indus-
trial Commission, this court may not set aside the 
decision even though on a review of the record 
we might well ha \'e reached a different result." 
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POINT SIX 
THAT THE ElVIPLOYMENT SECURITY 
ACT IS TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED 
TO ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTS BUT SUCH 
RULE DOES NOT PERMIT AN EXTENSION 
OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS TO ONE 
'!\THOSE INITIAL OR CONTINUED UNE.M-
PLOYMENT ~IAY BE VOLITIONAL. 
It is a generally acknowledged rule that Employ-
ment Security Acts are construed liberally to accom-
plish their purposes and objectives. However, in Utah 
and elsewhere the courts construe the Acts in a manner 
which distinguishes those petitioning as beneficiaries 
of the Act who become unemployed for reasons attribut-
able to themselves or whose failure to become re-em-
ployed may be attributable to their own actions or 
failure to act. In Kennecott Copper Corporation Em-
ployees v. Department of Employment Security, supra, 
this Court was careful to point out that the purpose 
of the Employment Security Act is to assist the worker 
and his family in times when, without fault on his part, 
he is out of work. In Olaf Nelson Construction Com-
pany v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 521, 243 P. 
2d 951, the Court noted that the underlying legislative 
intent is that the commission is to determine a claimant's 
eligibility for unemployment benefits by adhering to 
the volitional test, and declared the policy of the con-
tributions provisions of the statute to be to establish 
financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed 
through no fault of their own. 
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Representative of the position of other courts is 
the statement of the Kansas Court in Clark v. Board 
of Review, supra. In denying unemployment benefits 
on the grounds that the claimant had not made a rea-
sonable search for work, the Court noted as a factor 
in construction of the Act that " ... benefits are for 
those who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own and are willing, anxious, and ready to support 
themselves and family, and who are unemployed because 
of conditions over which they have no control." In a 
similar context the Alabama Supreme Court upheld 
the denial of unemployment benefits to a worker who 
had failed to show availability by reasonable efforts 
to seek work. In so doing the Court declared the un-
employment compensation law to be remedial and hence 
susceptible of liberal construction to realize its purpose. 
However, the Court noted that the Act was designed 
to ameliorate consequences of the failure of industry 
to provide jobs, i.e., to insure a diligent worker against 
the vicissitudes of enforced unemployment. Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The law imposes upon the commission a duty of 
distinguishing the eligible claimant who is "available 
for work" from one who does not meet this requirement. 
As an objective manifestation of a claimant's subjec-
tive condition of availability, the commission reasonably 
looks to the nature and extent of the claimant's efforts 
18 
to seek work and considers these in light of the claim-
ant's individual circumstances. Where there is substan-
tial evidence that a claimant's efforts to seek work are 
not reasonable under the circumstances, the commission 
may find the availability requirement not met and deny 
benefits. Such was the case with the appellant. There 
was evidence upon ther record which formed a basis for 
the commission's denial of benefits. Since there was sus-
taining evidence, the denial of benefits in this case was 
consistent with principles of construction applicable to 
the Employment Security Act and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
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